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et al.: Takings Clause

TAKINGS CLAUSE
N.Y. CoNs. art!, § 7(a):
Privateproperty shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
COURT OF APPEALS

Saratoga Water Services, Inc. v. Saratoga County Water
Authority1
(decided February 22, 1994)

Petitioner, Saratoga Water Services, Inc., and two individual
property owners, initiated a proceeding under the Eminent
Domain Procedure Law [hereinafter EDPL] section 2072 and
claimed that Public Authorities Law section 1199-eee(5) 3 violated
1. 83 N.Y.2d 205, 630 N.E.2d 648, 608 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1994).
2. N.Y. EM. DoM. PROC. LAW § 207 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1994).
Section 207 provides in pertinent part: "Any person or persons jointly or
severally, aggrieved by the condemnor's determination and findings made
pursuant to this article, may seek judicial review thereof by the appellate
division of the supreme court ....
Id.
3. N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAW § 1199-eee(5) (McKinney 1994). Section
1199-eee(5) provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise limited by this title, the authority shall have the
power:
To acquire... by condemnation pursuant to the eminent domain
procedure law... any real or personal property or interest
therein, within or without the district, as the authority may deem
necessary, convenient or desirable to carry out the purpose of this
title and to pay the costs thereof; .... Provided, however,
notwithstanding any provision of the eminent domain procedure
law to the contrary, in any proceeding brought by the
authority.., and compensation shall be paid only upon (a) a
decision by the supreme court that compensation for real property
condemned shall be determined solely by the income capitalization
method of valuation based on actual net income as allowed by the
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the New York State Constitution 4 by "unconstitutionally
divest[ing] the Judiciary of its power to determine just
compensation. ' 5 Petitioners further argued that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague. 6 The court held the statute
constitutional on two grounds. First, the statute did not work to
divest the supreme court of its power to determine the method of
compensation to be employed when private property was
appropriated for public use. 7 Second, the court held the statute

was not void for vagueness because the supreme court's valuation
of the property acquired under eminent domain occurs "as of the
time of the taking." 8
Respondent, Saratoga County Water Authority, issued notices
of a public hearing to be held in April 1992 for purposes of
informing the public that it was considering acquiring a portion
of petitioners' property and assets through condemnation. 9 After
the public hearing, respondent issued two "determination and
findings" statements which proclaimed that acquisition of
public service commission, and (b) such supreme court's
determination that the amount of such compensation shall be based
on the income capitalization method, entry of a final judgment, the
filing of the final decree and the conclusion of any appeal or the
expiration of the time to file an appeal related to the condemnation
proceeding. If any court shall utilize any method of compensation
other than the income capitalization method, or if the proposed
compensation is more than the rate base of the assets taken in
condemnation, as utilized by the public service commission in
setting rates and as certified by such commission, then the
authority may withdraw the condemnation proceeding without
prejudice or costs to any party ....
Id.
4. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 7(a). This section states: "Private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation." See N.Y. EM. DOM.
PROC. LAW § 512 (McKinney 1979). Section 512 provides in pertinent part:
"The court. . . shall determine the compensation due the condemnees for
damages as the result of the acquisition." Id.
5. Saratoga, 83 N.Y.2d at 209, 630 N.E.2d at 650, 608 N.Y.S.2d at
954.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 212, 630 N.E.2d at 652, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
8. Id. at 214, 630 N.E.2d at 652, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
9. Id. at 209, 630 N.E.2d at 650, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
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petitioners' property was necessary to operate a water system for
the town of Malta. 10 The

"determination

and

findings"

statements also announced that acquisition of petitioners'
property would aid in the development of a "[c]ounty-wide
coordinated public water system." 11 Petitioners, Saratoga Water
Services, Inc., a domestic corporation providing water "to
approximately 1350 customers,

. . .

and two individual property

owners," challenged respondent's findings in a proceeding
instituted by them in the appellate division. 12
In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the court noted
the inherent difficulty in valuating the property of the corporate
petitioner, a public utility.13 One difficulty, explained the court,
is the absence of sales of public utilities. 14 Further, valuation

problems arise because, in addition to the physical property, the
condemnor also acquires a "going business enterprise." 15
Various valuation methods, such as market value, 16 replacement
or reproduction less depreciation, 17 and income capitalization, 18
the court opined, were unsatisfactory in resolving this dilemma. 19
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 210, 630 N.E.2d at 650, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
14. Id. See Onondaga County Water Auth. v New York Water Serv.
Corp., 285 A.D. 655, 662, 139 N.Y.S.2d 755, 762 (4th Dep't 1955) ("The
absence of sales of similar [utility] property is one difficulty.").
15. Saratoga, 83 N.Y.2d at 210, 630 N.E.2d at 650, 608 N.Y.S.2d at
954.
16. Market value "is calculated by -reference to comparable sales between
willing buyers and sellers .... ." Id. See Onondaga County Water Auth., 285
A.D. at 662, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 763 (noting that the absence of a market for sale
of public utilities renders market value approach Unworkable).
17. The cost of reproduction method has been described as "the cost which
will necessarily be incurred by a reasonably prudent and careful man using
ordinary careful business methods in reproducing a plant of equal efficiency."
4A PHILIP NiCHOLs, THE LAV OF EMINENT DOmAN § 15.41[3] (3d ed. rev.
1993). See Onondaga, 285 A.D. at 662, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 763 (stating that the
reproduction less depreciation method cannot be used as an exclusive measure
of valuation because it accounts neither for intangible factors nor for "what
might well be a great disparity between earnings of a utility and replacement of
physical assets").
18. The income capitalization approach:
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The court confirmed the respondent's determinations and

findings, reasoning that Public Authorities Law section 1199eee(5) served a dual purpose. It afforded a property owner
protection by permitting the supreme court to utilize other
methods besides income capitalization in computing just
compensation. 20 Further, it allowed the condemnor "an avenue
of escape" should a valuation of condemned property be
unusually high. 2 1 Thus, the dual purpose, "while unusual," did

not render the statute unconstitutional. 22
Regarding the Saratogapetitioners' first contention that "PAL
section 1199-eee(5) impermissibly mandates exclusive use of the
income capitalization method . . and that such a legislative
command effectively usurps the power to determine just

compensation

designated

to

the Judiciary

by

the State

Constitution," 23 the court noted that legislative enactments are

presumptively constitutional, and that one attacking a legislative
[Sleeks to determine how much a buyer would pay for the right to
receive future cash flows. The evidence necessary in such an approach
include [sic] the following: provable past earnings on a periodic basis,
growth rate in use fees, projected cost increases, new users projected
and governmental restrictions on regulations capping expansion of
earnings.
5 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 19.071] (3d ed. rev. 1993). See
Saratoga, 83 N.Y.2d at 210, 630 N.E.2d at 650, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 954 (stating
that the income capitalization approach "remains subject to criticism,
principally because of the speculative nature of the valuation criteria used, and
because earned income imperfectly reflects the actual value of a utility whose
rates are subject to regulation") (citations omitted); Onondaga, 285 A.D. at
662, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 763 ("'The value of the property ...is determined by
its productiveness, the profits which its use brings to the owner.... The
value, therefore, is not determined by the mere cost of construction, but more
by what the completed structure brings in the way of earning to its owner.'"
(quoting Monogahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 328
(1893))).
19. Saratoga, 83 N.Y.2d at 210, 630 N.E.2d at 650, 608 N.Y.S.2d at
954.
20. Id. at 211, 630 N.E.2d at 651, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
21. Id. at 212, 630 N.E.2d at 651, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
22. Id. at 212, 630 N.E.2d at 652, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
23. Id. at 210-11, 630 N.E.2d at 650-51, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 954-55. See
N.Y. EM. DOM.

PROC. LAW

§ 512 (McKinney 1979).
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must

"'bear

the

burden

1189

of

demonstrating

[unconstitutionality] beyond a reasonable doubt."' 24 The court
construed the statute as merely implying a preference for the

income capitalization method, and not as a legislative mandate.25
This conclusion was compelled by the language employed in the
last sentence of the statute, which allows the condemnor to
withdraw from the condemnation proceeding if the court
employed a valuation method other than that of income

capitalization. 2 6 Finally, the court stated that the statute at issue
was similar to the Onondaga statute which the court in that case
held constitutional. 2 7

The statute at issue in Onondaga was section 5-a of the
Condemnation Law, and its amendments, which required the
Public Service Commission to certify: "(1) the annual net
24. Saratoga, 83 N.Y.2d at 211, 630 N.E.2d at 651, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 955
(quoting Alliance of Am. Insurers v. Chu, 71 N.Y.2d 573, 585, 571 N.E.2d
672, 678, 569 N.Y.S.2d 364, 370 (1991)).
25.Id.
26. Id. at 212, 630 N.E.2d at 651, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 955 (citing N.Y. Pue.
AUTH. LAW § 1199-eee(5) (McKinney 1994)). The Saratoga court also
reviewed the legislative history of the statute in reaching its determination, and
concluded that the legislative history supported its interpretation. Id. at 212,
630 N.E.2d at 651-52, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 955-56. However, the language used
in both the Legislative Memorandum and the Governor's Memorandum appear
contrary to the court's interpretation. The Legislative Memorandum provides
in part: "This bill would ensure that the capitalization method be used by the
court.... Should the condemnation court or any appellate court determine
that the income capitalization method is not appropriate, the bill provides that
title to the company's assets will not transferand the condemnationproceeding
will be withdravn." 1986 N.Y. Laws 755, Legislative Memorandum, 2998
(emphasis added).
The governor's memorandum is similar in tone:
[The condemnation court will utilize the income capitalization method
in computing the amount of the condemnation award.... However, if
the condemnation court determines that the income capitalization method
is not appropriate, the bill provides that title to the company's assets will
not transfer and permits the [condemnor] to withdraw from the
condemnation proceeding.
1986 N.Y. Laws 755, Governor's Memorandum. 3195.
27. Saratoga, 83 N.Y.2d at 212, 630 N.E.2d at 652, 608 N.Y.S.2d at
956.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1995

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1995], Art. 75

1190

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 11

earnings which the utility system involved might reasonably be
expected to continue to produce in the hands of the condemnee;
and (2) the rate base and rate of return from which that estimate
is derived." 28 The commissioners of appraisal were required to
wait until thirty days after the certificate was served before
determining the compensation to be paid to the owners of the
condemned property, and further were required to appraise the
property with "due regard" to the information contained in the
certificate. 29 If the appraisal was either not in accord with the
certificate, or if the Public Service Commission determined that
the amount of compensation to be so high as not to be in the
public interest, the statute provided that the Public Service
Commission could petition the court to abandon and discontinue
0
the condemnation proceeding. 3
The Onondagacourt held that there were no problems with the
constitutionality of the statute and its amendments. 3 1 Section 5-a
did not mandate that "the commissioners of appraisal
rigidly ...

adhere to the certification by the Public Service

Commission." '32 Nor did the statute assign duties to the Public
Service Commission which usurped the powers of the court under
the constitution. 33
As to the void for vagueness claim, the Saratoga court held
that even though title does not vest in the condemnor until the
appeals process is exhausted, the supreme court was not
"presently fixing the value of the property as of some
undetermined future date."' 34 Ordinarily, in a condemnation
proceeding, the condemnor's compensation is fixed as of the

28. Onondaga, 285 A.D. at 658-59, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 759-60.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 658, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
Id. at 658-59, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
Id. at 660, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
Id.

33. Id. At issue in Onondaga was article I, § 7 of the New York
Constitution.
34. Saratoga, 83 N.Y.2d at 213, 630 N.E.2d at 652, 608 N.Y.S.2d at
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moment title to the property vests in the condemnor. 35 However,
the statute at issue modified the general rule by separating the
"taking" from the condemnee, from the vesting of title in the
condemnor.3.6
Under the EDPL, a condemnor is in possession of the property
upon the filing of an acquisition map at the end of the acquisition
38
proceeding. 37 The value of the property is fixed as of that date.
Title, however, does not vest in the condemnor until after the
appeals process is concluded. 3 9 The later vesting permits the
condemnor to withdraw from the condemnation proceeding if the
income capitalization method is not employed without violating
the well-settled rule that a condemnor cannot abandon property
condemned after title vests. 40 Thus, since valuation at the
moment of the condemnor is in possession of the property, the
1
statute was held not to be unconstitutionally vague. 4
As Saratogademonstrates, valuation of public utilities presents
complex problems in eminent domain proceedings. However, as
this case points out, so long as a statute aids the court in
ascertaining the correct worth of the property and does not
abrogate any of the court's constitutional powers, the statute will
survive constitutional scrutiny.
35. Id. at 213-14, 630 N.E.2d at 652, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 956. See In re City
of N.Y., 43 N.Y.2d 512, 518, 373 N.E.2d 984, 987, 402 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807
(1978) ("[A] condemnee is entitled to just compensation as of the instant its
property is taken by the vesting of title in the condemnor. It is as of that time
that the value is to be fixed ....").
36. Saratogq, 83 N.Y.2d. at 213, 630 N.E.2d at 652, 608 N.Y.S.2d at
956.
37. Id. at 213-14, 630 N.E.2d at 652, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
i8.Id. at 214, 630 N.E.2d at 652, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
39. Id.
40. Id. See 6 NicHoLs, TIH LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 26.42[2] (3rd
ed. rev. 1993) ("The right to vest title in the condemnor and the right to
abandon and discontinue the proceeding after such vesting are mutually
exclusive rights. The courts have uniformly held that condemnation
proceedings cannot be discontinued after the condemnor has taken title.")
(citations omitted).
41. Saratoga, 83 N.Y.2d. at 214, 630 N.E.2d at 652, 608 N.Y.S.2d at
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